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Abstract
We show the existence of involuntary unemployment based on consumers’ utility max-
imization and firms’ profit maximization behavior under monopolistic competition with
increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale technology using a three-periods over-
lapping generations (OLG) model with a childhood period as well as younger and older
periods. We also analyze the effects of fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit
(or seigniorage) to realize full-employment under a situation with involuntary unemploy-
ment. We show the following results. 1) If the realization of full employment will
increase consumers’ disposable income, in order to realize full-employment from a state
with involuntary unemployment, we need a budget deficit (Proposition 1). 2) If the
full-employment state has been realized, we do not need budget deficit to maintain full-
employment (Proposition 2). Additionally we present a game-theoretic interpretation of
involuntary unemployment and full-employment.
Keywords: Involuntary unemployment, Three-periods overlapping generations model, Mo-
nopolistic competition.
1
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the effects of fiscal policy to realize full-employment under a situation
with involuntary unemployment. Involuntary unemployment in this paper is a situation where
workers are willing to work at the market wage or just below but are prevented by factors
beyond their control, mainly, deficiency of aggregate demand. Umada (1997) derived an
upward-sloping labor demand curve from the mark-up principle for firms, and argued that such
an upward-sloping labor demand curve leads to the existence of involuntary unemployment
without wage rigidity1. But his model of firm behavior is ad-hoc. Otaki (2009) says that
there exists involuntary unemployment for two reasons: (i) the nominal wage rate is set above
the reservation nominal wage rate; and (ii) the employment level and economic welfare never
improve by lowering the nominal wage rate. He assume indivisibility (or inelasticity) of
individual labor supply. He has shown the existence of involuntary unemployment using
efficient wage bargaining according to McDonald and Solow (1981). The arguments of this
paper, however, do not depend on bargaining. If labor supply is indivisible, it may be 1 or 0.
On the other hand, if it is divisible, it takes a real value between 0 and 1. As discussed by Otaki
(2015) (Theorem 2.3) and Otaki (2012), if the labor supply is divisible and very small, no
unemployment exists2. However, we show that even if labor supply is divisible, unless it is so
small, theremay exit involuntary unemployment. We consider consumers’ utilitymaximization
and firms’ profit maximization in an overlapping generations (OLG) model under monopolistic
competition according to Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011, 2015), and demonstrate the existence of
involuntary unemployment without the assumption of wage rigidity.
Alsowe analyze the effects of fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit (or seigniorage).
We show the following results.
1. If the realization of full employment will increase consumers’ disposable income, in
order to realize full-employment from a state with involuntary unemployment, we need
a budget deficit. (Proposition 1)
2. If the full-employment state has been realized, we do not need budget deficit to maintain
full-employment. (Proposition 2)
From these results we can say that in order to realize full-employment from a state with
involuntary unemployment we need budget deficit of the government. However, when full-
employment is realized, in order to maintain full-employment we need balanced budget.
Therefore, additional government expenditure to realize full-employment should be financed
by seigniorage not public debt.
In the next section we analyze and show the existence of involuntary unemployment under
monopolistic competition with increasing or decreasing or constant returns to scale technology
using a three-periods OLG model with a childhood period as well as younger (working) and
older (retired) periods. Also we consider pay-as-you go pension system for the older generation.
In a simple two-periods OLG model falls in the nominal wage rate and prices of goods may
increase consumption and employment by the so-called real balance effect. In such a model
1Lavoie (2001) presented a similar analysis.
2About the indivisible labor supply also please see Hansen (1985).
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consumers have savings for future consumption, but no debt. In a three-periods model with
childhood period they consume goods in their childhood period by borrowing money from
(employed) consumers of the previous generation and/or scholarships, and must repay their
debts in the next period. Real value of the debt is increased by falls in the nominal wage rate and
prices, and consumptions and employment may decrease. In addition to this configuration we
consider a pay-as-you go pension system for the older generation which may reduce the savings
of consumers. We think our model is more general and realistic than a simple two-periods OLG
model. In Section 3 we examine the effects of a fall in the nominal wage rate. In our three-
periods OLG model with pay-as-you-go pension an increase in consumption and employment
due to falls in the nominal wage rate and prices of goods might be small or even negative.
In Section 4 we study the fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit (or seigniorage) to
realize full-employment at a state with involuntary unemployment. Additionally we present a
game-theoretic interpretation of involuntary unemployment and full-employment in Section 5.
As we will state in the concluding remarks, the main limitation of this paper is that the goods
are produced by only labor and there exists no capital and investment of firms. A study of
the problem of involuntary unemployment and fiscal policy in such a situation is the theme of
future research.
This paper is an extension and generalization of some recent our papers, Tanaka (2020b)
and Tanaka (2020a) in which we analyze the existence of involuntary unemployment and fiscal
policy under perfect competition with indivisible labor supply.
Schultz (1992) showed that there does not exists involuntary unemployment in an overlapping
generations model. His arguments depends on the real balance effect on consumption of the
older generations consumers. Even with involuntary unemployment, the nominal wage rate
does not necessarily fall. In this paper, however, we consider a three generations overlapping
generations model with pay-as-you go pension to explore the possibility of avoiding the real
balance effect. See Section 3.
2 Existence of involuntary unemployment
2.1 Consumers
We consider a three-periods (0: childhood, 1: younger or working, and 2: older or retired)
OLG model under monopolistic competition. It is a re-arrangement and an extension of the
model put forth by Otaki (2007), Otaki (2009), and Otaki (2015). The structure of our model
is as follows.
1. There is one factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of perishable goods
indexed by 𝑧 ∈ [0, 1]. Good 𝑧 is monopolistically produced by firm 𝑧 with increasing or
decreasing or constant returns to scale technology.
2. Consumers consume the goods during the childhood period (Period 0). This consumption
is covered by borrowing money from (employed) consumers of the younger generation
and/or scholarships. They must repay these debts in their Period 1. However, unem-
ployed consumers cannot repay their own debts. Therefore, we assume that unemployed
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consumers receive unemployment benefits from the government, which are covered by
taxes on employed consumers of the younger generation.
3. During Period 1, consumers supply 𝑙 units of labor, repay the debts and save money for
their consumption in Period 2. They also pay taxes for the pay-as-you go pension system
for the older generation.
4. During Period 2, consumers consume the goods using their savings carried over from
their Period 1 earnings, and receive the pay-as-you go pension, which is a lump-sum
payment. It is covered by taxes on employed consumers of the younger generation.
5. Consumers determine their consumptions in Periods 1 and 2 and the labor supply at the
beginning of Period 1. We assume that their consumption during the childhood period
is constant.
We use the following notation.
𝐶𝑒
𝑖
: consumption basket of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝐶𝑢
𝑖
: consumption basket of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑐𝑒
𝑖
(𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑐𝑢
𝑖
(𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝐷: consumption basket of an individual in the childhood period, which is constant.
𝑃𝑖: the price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑝𝑖 (𝑧): the price of good 𝑧 in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝜌 =
𝑃2
𝑃1
: (expected) inflation rate (plus one).
𝑊 : nominal wage rate.
𝑅: unemployment benefit for an unemployed individual. 𝑅 = 𝐷.
?ˆ?: consumption basket in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝑄: pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the older generation.
Θ: tax payment by an employed individual for the unemployment benefit.
?ˆ?: pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the younger generation when they retire.
Ψ: tax payment by an employed individual for the pay-as-you-go pension.
Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer.
𝑙: labor supply of an individual.
Γ(𝑙): disutility function of labor, which is increasing and convex.
𝐿: total employment.
𝐿 𝑓 : population of labor or employment in the full-employment state.
𝑦(𝐿𝑙): labor productivity, which is increasing or decreasing or constant
with respect to “employment × labor supply” (𝐿𝑙).
We assume that the population 𝐿 𝑓 is constant.
We consider a two-step method to solve utility maximization of consumers such that:
1. Employed and unemployed consumers maximize their utility by determining consump-
tion baskets in Periods 1 and 2 given their income over two periods:
2. Then, they maximize their consumption baskets given the expenditure in each period.
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We define the elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to “employment × labor
supply” as follows,
𝜁 =
𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝐿𝑙
.
We assume that −1 < 𝜁 < 1, and 𝜁 is constant. Increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to
scale means 𝜁 > 0 (𝜁 < 0 or 𝜁 = 0).
Since the taxes for unemployed consumers’ debts are paid by employed consumers of the
same generation, 𝐷 and Θ satisfy the following relationship.
𝐷 (𝐿 𝑓 − 𝐿) = 𝐿Θ.
This means
𝐿 (𝐷 + Θ) = 𝐿 𝑓𝐷.
The price of the consumption basket in Period 0 is assumed to be 1. Thus, 𝐷 is the real value
of the consumption in the childhood period of consumers.
Also, since the taxes for the pay-as-you-go pension system are paid by employed consumers
of younger generation, 𝑄 and Ψ satisfy the following relationship:
𝐿Ψ = 𝐿 𝑓𝑄.
The utility function of employed consumers of one generation over three periods is written
as
𝑢(𝐶𝑒
1
, 𝐶𝑒
2
, 𝐷) − Γ(𝑙).
We assume that 𝑢(·) is a homothetic utility function. The utility function of unemployed
consumers is
𝑢(𝐶𝑢
1
, 𝐶𝑢
2
, 𝐷).
The consumption baskets of employed and unemployed consumers in Period 𝑖 are
𝐶𝑒𝑖 =
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒𝑖 (𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
, 𝑖 = 1, 2,
and
𝐶𝑢𝑖 =
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑢𝑖 (𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution among the goods, and 𝜎 > 1.
The price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖 is
𝑃𝑖 =
(∫
1
0
𝑝𝑖 (𝑧)
1−𝜎𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜎
, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
The budget constraint for en employed consumer is3
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
= 𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ.
3Employed consumers of the younger generation lend money to consumers in the childhood period of the next
generation. It is repaid in the next period.
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The budget constraint for en unemployed consumer is
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
= Π − 𝐷 + 𝑅 + ?ˆ?
Since 𝑅 = 𝐷,
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
= Π + ?ˆ?.
Let
𝛼 =
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
, 1 − 𝛼 =
𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
. (1)
Since the utility functions 𝑢(𝐶𝑒
1
, 𝐶𝑒
2
, 𝐷) and 𝑢(𝐶𝑢
1
, 𝐶𝑢
2
, 𝐷) are homothetic, 𝛼 is determined by
the relative price 𝑃2
𝑃1
, and do not depend on the income of the consumers. Therefore, we have
𝛼 =
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
1 − 𝛼 =
𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
From the first order conditions and the budget constraints for employed and unemployed
consumers we obtain the following demand functions for consumption baskets.
𝐶𝑒
1
= 𝛼
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃1
, 𝐶𝑒
2
= (1 − 𝛼)
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃2
,
and
𝐶𝑢
1
= 𝛼
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, 𝐶𝑢
2
= (1 − 𝛼)
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃2
.
Lagrange functions in the second step for employed and unemployed consumers are
ℒ
𝑒
1
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
(2)
− 𝜆𝑒
1
[∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ)
]
,
ℒ
𝑒
2
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
2
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑒
2
[∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − (1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ)
]
,
ℒ
𝑢
1
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑢
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑢
1
[∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑢
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
]
,
and
ℒ
𝑢
2
=
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑢
2
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑢
2
[∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑢
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
]
.
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𝜆𝑒
1
, 𝜆𝑒
2
, 𝜆𝑢
1
and𝜆𝑢
2
are Lagrangemultipliers. Solving thesemaximization problems, the following
demand functions of employed and unemployed consumers are derived4.
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ)
𝑃1
,
𝑐𝑒
2
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝2(𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜎
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ)
𝑃2
,
𝑐𝑢
1
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
𝑃1
,
and
𝑐𝑢
2
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝2(𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜎
(1 − 𝛼)(Π + ?ˆ?)
𝑃2
.
From these analyses we obtain the indirect utility functions of employed and unemployed
consumers as follows:
𝑉 𝑒 = 𝑢
(
𝛼
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃1
, (1 − 𝛼)
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃2
, 𝐷
)
− Γ(𝑙),
and
𝑉𝑢 = 𝑢
(
𝛼
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, (1 − 𝛼)
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃2
, 𝐷
)
.
Let
𝜔 =
𝑊
𝑃1
, 𝜌 =
𝑃2
𝑃1
.
Then, since the real value of 𝐷 in the childhood period is constant, we can write
𝑉 𝑒 = 𝜑
(
𝜔𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃1
, 𝜌
)
− Γ(𝑙),
𝑉𝑢 = 𝜑
(
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, 𝜌
)
,
𝜔 is the real wage rate. Denote
𝐼 = 𝜔𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃1
. (3)
The condition for maximization of 𝑉 𝑒 with respect to 𝑙 given 𝜌 is
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
𝜔 − Γ′(𝑙) = 0, (4)
4About some calculations of these maximization problems please see Appendix
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where
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
= 𝛼
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑒
1
+ (1 − 𝛼)
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑒
2
.
Given 𝑃1 and 𝜌 the labor supply is a function of 𝜔. From (4) we get
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
=
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
𝜔𝑙
Γ′′(𝑙) −
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
𝜔2
. (5)
If 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, the labor supply is increasing with respect to the real wage rate 𝜔.
2.2 Firms
Let 𝑑1(𝑧) be the total demand for good 𝑧 by younger generation consumers in Period 1. Then,
𝑑1(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿Θ + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿Ψ)
𝑃1
=
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎 𝛼 (𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄)
𝑃1
.
This is the sum of the demand of employed and unemployed consumers. Note that ?ˆ? is the
pay-as-you-go pension for younger generation consumers in their Period 2. Similarly, their
total demand for good 𝑧 in Period 2 is written as
𝑑2(𝑧) =
(
𝑝2(𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜎 (1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄)
𝑃2
.
Let 𝑑2(𝑧) be the demand for good 𝑧 by the older generation. Then,
𝑑2(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎 (1 − ?¯?) (?¯? ?¯?𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓 Π¯ − 𝐿 𝑓 ?¯? + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿 𝑓 ?¯?)
𝑃1
,
where ?¯? , Π¯, ?¯?, 𝑙, ?¯? and ?¯? are the nominal wage rate, the profits of firms, the employment, the
individual labor supply, the debt of an individual, and the pay-as-you-go pension, respectively,
during the previous period. ?¯? is the value of 𝛼 for the older generation. 𝑄 is the pay-as-you-go
pension for consumers of the older generation themselves. Let
𝑀 = (1 − ?¯?)
(
?¯? ?¯?𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓 Π¯ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿 𝑓 ?¯?
)
.
This is the total savings or the total consumption of the older generation consumers including
the pay-as-you-go pensions they receive in their Period 2. It is the planned consumption that
is determined in Period 1 of the older generation consumers. Net savings is the difference
between 𝑀 and the pay-as-you-go pensions in their Period 2, as follows:
𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄.
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Their demand for good 𝑧 is written as
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝑀
𝑃1
. Government expenditure constitutes the
national income as well as the consumptions of the younger and older generations. Then, the
total demand for good 𝑧 is written as
𝑑 (𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝑌
𝑃1
, (6)
where 𝑌 is the effective demand defined by
𝑌 = 𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Note that ?ˆ? is consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer. 𝐺 is the
government expenditure, except for the pay-as-you-go pensions, scholarships and unemploy-
ment benefits (see Otaki (2007), Otaki (2015) about this demand function). Now, we assume
that𝐺 is financed by seigniorage similarly to Otaki (2007) and Otaki (2009). In a later section,
we will consider the government’s budget constraint with respect to taxes.
Let 𝐿 and 𝐿𝑙 be employment and the “employment × labor supply” of firm 𝑧. The total
employment and the total “employment × labor supply” are also∫
1
0
𝐿𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿,
∫
1
0
𝐿𝑙𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿𝑙.
The output of firm 𝑧 is 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙). At the equilibrium 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑑 (𝑧). Then, we have
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
= (𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′)
𝜕 (𝐿𝑙)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
.
From (6)
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
= −𝜎
𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑝1(𝑧)
.
The profit of firm 𝑧 is
𝜋(𝑧) = 𝑝1(𝑧)𝑑 (𝑧) −
𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
The condition for profit maximization is
𝜕𝜋(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
=𝑑 (𝑧) +
©­«𝑝1(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
𝑦′𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)2
𝑊
ª®¬
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
=𝑑 (𝑧) +
©­«𝑝1(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊
ª®¬
𝜕𝑑 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1(𝑧)
=𝑑 (𝑧) − 𝜎
(
𝑝1(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′
)
𝑑 (𝑧)
𝑝1(𝑧)
= 0
Therefore, we obtain
𝑝1(𝑧) = −
𝜎
(1 − 𝜎) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
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Let 𝜇 = 1
𝜎
. Then,
𝑝1(𝑧) =
1
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
This means that the real wage rate is
𝜔 = (1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙). (7)
With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale, 𝜔 is increasing (decreasing or con-
stant) with respect to “employment × labor supply” 𝐿𝑙.
From (3), (4) and (7), we have
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
(1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − Γ′(𝑙) = 0,
with
𝐼 = (1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ
𝑃1
.
Then, from (5)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
=
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
𝑑𝜔
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
=
[
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙
]
(1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦′
Γ′′(𝑙) −
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
[(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦′]2
.
Assuming 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale 𝑦′ > 0 (𝑦 < 0), this is positive
(negative). Since
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 + 𝐿
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
, (8)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
=
(
𝑙 + 𝐿
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
.
Thus,
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑙
1 − 𝐿 𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
.
Usually 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
and 𝑑𝑙
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
have the same sign, and we assume
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
> 0 in (8). Also we assume
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙))
𝐿𝑙
= 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′ = 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)(1 + 𝜁) > 0. (9)
Then, the output 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increases by an increase in 𝐿.
Since all firms are symmetric,
𝑃1 = 𝑝1(𝑧) =
1
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊. (10)
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2.3 Involuntary unemployment
Aggregate supply of the goods is equal to
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿 𝑓Π = 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙).
Aggregate demand is
𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
=𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Since they are equal,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀,
or
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
1 − 𝛼
.
In real terms5
𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
, (11)
or
𝐿𝑙 =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
.
From (4) and (5) the individual labor supply 𝑙 is a (usually increasing) function of 𝜔. From
(7) 𝜔 is a function of 𝐿𝑙. With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale technology
it is increasing (decreasing or constant) with respect to 𝐿𝑙 or with respect to 𝐿 given 𝑙. The
individual labor supply 𝑙 may be increasing or decreasing in 𝐿 or 𝐿𝑙. However, we assume that
𝐿𝑙 is increasing in 𝐿. This requires
𝑑𝐿𝑙
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 +
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
> 0.
Itmeans 𝐿𝑙 < 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 for 𝐿 < 𝐿 𝑓 . The equilibriumvalue of 𝐿𝑙 cannot be larger than 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙. However,
it may be strictly smaller than 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙. Then, we have 𝐿 < 𝐿 𝑓 and involuntary umemployment
exists.
If the government collects a lump-sum tax 𝑇 from the younger generation consumers, the
aggregate demand is
𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿 𝑓Π − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
=𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
5 1
1−𝛼
is a multiplier.
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2.4 Discussion summary
The real wage rate depends on the employment elasticity of the labor productivity and the
employment level. But the employment level does not depend on the real wage rate. The real
aggregate demand and the employment level are determined by the value of
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
𝑃1
. (12)
If employment is smaller than the labor population, then involuntary unemployment exists.
2.5 The case of full-employment
If 𝐿𝑙 = 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙, full-employment is realized. Then, (11) is re-written as
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
. (13)
Since 𝐿 𝑓 and 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 are constant (if 𝐿 = 𝐿 𝑓 , 𝜔 is constant), this is an identity not an equation.
On the other hand, (11) is an equation not an identity. (13) should be written as
𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
≡ 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙).
This yields:
𝑃1 =
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙)
[𝛼
(
−𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀] .
Then, the nominal wage rate is determined by:
𝑊 = (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙)𝑃1.
3 Effects of a decrease in the nominal wage rate
In the model of this paper, no mechanism determines the nominal wage rate except at the
full-employment state. For example, when the nominal value of 𝐺 increases, the nominal
aggregate demand and supply increase. If the nominal wage rate rises, the prices also rise.
If, when 𝐺 increases, the prices rise considerably, then the outputs might not increase and
involuntary unemployment might not decrease. If the prices do not rise or rise only slightly,
involuntary unemployment decreases.
Let us examine the effects on employment of a decrease in the nominal wage rate. A decrease
in the nominal wage rate induces a decrease in the prices of the goods (see (10)), and it does
not directly rescue involuntary unemployment. Proposition 2.1 in Otaki (2016) says
12
Suppose that the nominal wage sags. Then, as far as its indirect effects on the
aggregate demand are negligible, this only results in causing a proportionate fall
in the price level. In other words, a fall in the nominal wage never rescues workers
who are involuntarily unemployed.
However, indirect effects on aggregate demand due to a fall in the nominal wage rate may exist.
We assume that falls in the nominal wage rate and the prices are not predicted by consumers.
If the prices of the goods fall, the real value of the older generation’s savings increases. But,
at the same time, a decrease in the prices of the goods increase the real value of the younger
generation consumers’ debts.
The real values of the following variables will be maintained even when both the nominal
wage rate and the prices fall.
𝐺/𝑃1: the government expenditure.
?ˆ?/𝑃1: consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝑄/𝑃1: pay-as-you-go pension for an older generation consumer.
?ˆ?/𝑃1: pay-as-you-go pension for a younger generation consumer when he retires.
On the other hand, the nominal value of 𝐷 and that of 𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄, which is the older
generation’s net savings, do not change. Therefore, from (12), whether a fall in the nominal
wage rate increases or decreases the effective demand depends on whether
𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄 − 𝛼𝐿 𝑓𝐷 (14)
is positive or negative. This is the so-called real balance effect. If 𝐷 or 𝑄 is large, (14) is
negative, and a fall in the nominal wage rate increases involuntary unemployment6.
4 Analysis of fiscal policy
4.1 Steady state with constant employment under constant
prices
First consider a steady state where the employment is constant. With constant employment
the real wage rate and labor supply do not change, thus the output also does not change. We
assume also 𝜌 = 1, that is, the constant prices of the goods. Consumers correctly predict that
the prices are constant. Let 𝑇 be the tax revenue. Then,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀. (15)
At the steady sate it must be that ?ˆ? = 𝐷 and ?ˆ? = 𝑄. Thus,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀. (16)
6The discussion in this section is from the different perspectives of the real balance effect for which the argument
was fought by Pigou (1943) and Kalecki (1944).
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The savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go pension is equal to 𝑀 .
Therefore,
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷
]
= 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝑀 = 𝑀. (17)
This means
𝐺 − 𝑇 = 0.
Thus, to maintain a sate with constant employment and prices we need balanced budget.
4.2 Fiscal policy for full-employment under constant prices
Next, consider a fiscal policy to realize full-employment from the state with involuntary
unemployment. The employment 𝐿 and the output 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increase by fiscal policy. We
assume constant prices of the goods again. Consumers correctly predict that the prices are
constant. If the employment 𝐿 increases, labor supply 𝑙, the real wage rate 𝜔 and the labor
productivity 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increase in the case of increasing returns to scale. However, in the case
of decreasing returns to scale, labor supply, the real wage rate and the labor productivity may
decrease. In the former (latter) case the rate of increase in the output is probably larger (smaller)
than the rate of increase in the employment. By (9) we can assume that both are positive.
Let 𝐺′ and 𝑇 ′ be the government expenditure and the tax to realize full-employment. Then,
(16) is written as
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷
]
+ 𝐺′ + 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀.
From this
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷
]
= 𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ + 𝑀. (18)
Suppose 𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ > 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 , that is, the realization of full employment will
increase consumers’ disposable income. Then, from (17) and (18) we get
𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ > 0. (19)
From this we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the realization of full employment will increase consumers’ disposable
income, in order to realize full-employment from a state with involuntary unemployment, we
need a budget deficit.
Let 𝐺′′, 𝑇 ′′ and 𝑀′ be the government expenditure, the tax revenue and the savings of the
younger generation consumers in the next period after realization of full-employment. (16) is
written as
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷
]
+ 𝐺′′ + 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀
′.
Tomaintain full-employment at the steady state the savings of the younger generation including
the pay-as-you-go pension must be equal to 𝑀′. Then, we have
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷] = 𝐺
′′ − 𝑇 ′′ + 𝑀′ = 𝑀′.
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Therefore,
𝐺′′ − 𝑇 ′′ = 0.
This means that to maintain full-employment, budget deficit is not required. Thus, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the full-employment state has been realized by fiscal policy, we do not need
budget deficit to maintain full-employment.
Demand and supply of money
Demand for money carried over from Period 1 to Period 2 by consumers of the younger
generation is equal to the savings by consumers of the younger generation. It is equal to
“consumption by consumers of the younger generation in the next period” − “pay-
as-you-go pension for the younger generation in the next period” − “repayment of
the debt by consumers of the next generation”.
On the other hand, supply of money is equal to
“consumption by consumers of the older generation” − “pay-as-you-go pension
for the older generation” − “repayment of the debt by consumers of the younger
generation” + “government expenditure” − “taxes for government expenditure”.
At the steady state with constant prices we have
“pay-as-you-go pension for the younger generation in the next period” = “pay-as-
you-go pension for the older generation”,
and
“repayment of the debt by consumers the next generation” = “repayment of the
debt by consumers of the younger generation”.
Scholarships are offset by supply and repayment.
If the output is constant,
“consumption by consumers of the younger generation in the next period” =
“consumption by consumers of the older generation”,
and
“government expenditure” − “taxes for government expenditure”= 0.
Thus, demand for money and supply of money are equal.
If the output increases at the rate of 𝜂 − 1,
“consumption by consumers of the younger generation in the next period” −
“consumption by consumers of the older generation” = (𝜂 − 1)× “consumption by
consumers of the older generation”
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(19) means
“government expenditure” − “taxes for government expenditure” = (𝜂− 1)× “con-
sumption by consumers of the older generation”.
Thus, demand for money and supply of money are equal in this case, too, and money supply
increases by
“government expenditure” − “taxes for government expenditure”.
4.3 Realization of full-employment under inflation or deflation
First we assume that the output and the employment are constant, and the prices of the goods
rise or fall at the rate 𝜌 − 1. If 𝜌 > 1(< 1), consumers correctly predict that the prices rise
(fall). Let 𝑇 be the tax revenue. With 𝜌 ≠ 0, ?ˆ? = 𝜌𝐷 and ?ˆ? = 𝜌𝑄. Thus, (15) is written as
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝜌𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀. (20)
The savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go pension must be equal to
𝜌𝑀 . Therefore,
(1−𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
= 𝐺−𝑇 + (𝜌−1)𝐿 𝑓 (𝐷+𝑄) +𝑀 = 𝜌𝑀. (21)
This means that:
𝐺 − 𝑇 = (𝜌 − 1) (𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄). (22)
If 𝑀 > 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄, in order to maintain a state where the output and the employment are
constant with rising prices (𝜌 > 1) (falling prices (𝜌 < 1)) a budget deficit (surplus) is required.
If 𝑀 < 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿 𝑓𝑄, we obtain the inverse results.
Let 𝐺′ and 𝑇 ′ be the government expenditure and the tax to realize full-employment. Then,
(20) is written as
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺′ + 𝜌𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀.
From this
(1− 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
= 𝐺′ −𝑇 ′ + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓 (𝐷 +𝑄) +𝑀. (23)
Suppose 𝑃1𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′ > 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 , that is, the realization of full employment will
increase consumers’ disposable income. Then, from (21) and (23) we get
𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ > (𝜌 − 1) (𝑀 − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄).
Therefore, in order to realize full-employment under inflation or deflation we need budget
deficit which is larger than (22).
Let 𝐺′′, 𝑇 ′′, 𝑀′ and 𝑃′
1
be the government expenditure, the tax revenue, the savings of the
younger generation consumers and the price of the consumption basket in the next period after
realization of full-employment. (20) is written as
𝑃′
1
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃′
1
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) − 𝑇
′′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺′′ + 𝜌𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀
′.
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Tomaintain full-employment, the savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go
pension must be equal to 𝜌𝑀′. Then, we have
(1−𝛼) [𝑃′
1
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) −𝑇
′′− 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌−1)𝐿 𝑓𝑄] = 𝐺
′′−𝑇 ′′+ (𝜌−1)𝐿 𝑓 (𝐷 +𝑄) +𝑀
′
= 𝜌𝑀′.
Therefore,
𝐺′′ − 𝑇 ′′ = (𝜌 − 1)(𝑀′ − 𝐿 𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿 𝑓𝑄).
This means that to maintain full-employment, budget deficit larger than (22) is not required.
5 Game-theoretic interpretation of involuntary
unemployment and full-employment
A steady state under balanced budget with involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium
of a game with firms and consumers.
1. Given the government expenditure and tax, and the strategies of consumers and other
firms, each firm maximizes its profit. Consumers’ strategies are labor supply and
consumption. Firms’ strategies are employment and production.
2. Given the government expenditure and tax, and the strategies of other consumers and
firms, each employed consumer and each unemployed consumer maximize their util-
ity. Each unemployed consumer determines his strategy given a state where he is not
employed.
Further we present three more results.
1. Increases in employment and production by firms and increases in labor supply and con-
sumption by consumers take the state out of the Nash equilibrium because consumption
of the older generation consumers is insufficient.
2. If the government increases its expenditure keeping taxes intact, the full-employment
state may be in a Nash equilibrium. The budget deficit makes up for deficiency of
consumption of the older generation consumers.
3. Then, in the next period we can realize full-employment without budget deficit because
consumption of the older generation consumers, who work when they are young, is larger
than consumption of the older generation consumers in the previous period. This is a
property of a dynamic OLG model.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remark
From Propositions 1 and 2 we can say that in order to realize full-employment from a state
with involuntary unemployment we need budget deficit of the government. However, when
full-employment is realized, in order to maintain full-employment we need balanced budget.
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Therefore, additional government expenditure to realize full-employment should be financed
by seigniorage not public debt.
We have examined the existence of involuntary umemployment and the effects of fiscal
policy using a three-generation OLG model under monopolistic competition with increasing,
decreasing or constant returns to scale. We considered the case of a divisible labor supply, and
we assumed that the goods are produced only by labor.
In future research, we want to analyze involuntary unemployment and fiscal policy in a
situation where goods are produced by capital and labor, and there exist investments of firms.
Appendix: Some calculations
The first condition for (2) is(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)−
1
𝜎 − 𝜆𝑒
1
𝑝1(𝑧) = 0. (A.1)
From this (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 =
(
𝜆𝑒
1
)1−𝜎
𝑝1(𝑧)
1−𝜎 .
Then, (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
)−1 ∫ 1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧 =
(
𝜆𝑒
1
)1−𝜎 ∫ 1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)
1−𝜎𝑑𝑧 = 1,
It means
𝜆𝑒
1
(∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)
1−𝜎𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜎
= 1,
and so
𝑃1 =
1
𝜆𝑒
1
.
From (A.1 ) (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 = 𝜆𝑒
1
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧).
Then, (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
𝜎−1
∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧 =
(∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
=𝐶𝑒
1
= 𝜆𝑒
1
∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 =
1
𝑃1
∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧.
Therefore, ∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
.
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Similarly, ∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
.
Thus,∫
1
0
𝑝1(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
1
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +
∫
1
0
𝑝2(𝑧)𝑐
𝑒
2
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
+ 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
= 𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ.
From (1)
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
= 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ).
By (A.1 ) (∫
1
0
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)
𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)−1 = 𝐶𝑒
1
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧)−1 =
(
𝜆𝑒
1
)𝜎
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝜎
=
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)𝜎
.
From this we get
𝑐𝑒
1
(𝑧) =
(
𝑝1(𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? −Ψ)
𝑃1
.
𝑐𝑒
2
(𝑧), 𝑐𝑢
1
(𝑧) and 𝑐𝑢
2
(𝑧) are similarly obtained.
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